A Generalization of the Minisum and Minimax Voting Methods by Sivarajan, Shankar N.
ar
X
iv
:1
61
1.
01
36
4v
2 
 [c
s.G
T]
  1
7 J
an
 20
18
A Generalization of the Minisum and Minimax
Voting Methods
Shankar N. Sivarajan
Undergraduate, Department of Physics
Indian Institute of Science
Bangalore 560 012, India
shankarnsivarajan@gmail.com
Faculty Advisor: Prof. Y. Narahari
Department of Computer Science and Automation
Abstract
In this paper, we propose a family of approval voting-schemes for electing
committees based on the preferences of voters. In our schemes, we calcu-
late the vector of distances of the possible committees from each of the
ballots and, for a given p-norm, choose the one that minimizes the magni-
tude of the distance vector under that norm. The minisum and minimax
methods suggested by previous authors and analyzed extensively in the
literature naturally appear as special cases corresponding to p = 1 and
p = ∞, respectively. Supported by examples, we suggest that using a
small value of p, such as 2 or 3, provides a good compromise between the
minisum and minimax voting methods with regard to the weightage given
to approvals and disapprovals. For large but finite p, our method reduces
to finding the committee that covers the maximum number of voters, and
this is far superior to the minimax method which is prone to ties. We also
discuss extensions of our methods to ternary voting.
I. Introduction
In this paper, we consider the problem of selecting a committee of k members
out of n candidates based on preferences expressed by m voters. The most
common way of conducting this election is to allow each voter to select his
favorite candidate and vote for him/her, and we select the k candidates with the
most number of votes. While this system is easy to understand and implement,
upon scrutiny, there arise certain unfavorable aspects.
Suppose we wish to elect a committee of size k = 1, and that there are two
candidates, a Conservative A, and a Liberal B, with B expected to win. In this
case, it is to candidate A’s benefit to introduce a candidate C whose ideology
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is similar to that of candidate B in order to draw votes away from B, thereby
ensuring his own victory. This may be accomplished in practice by providing
campaign funding, for example. This is illustrated by the following example.
Assume the preferences of the voters for the various candidates are as indicated
in Table 1. The first entry (A,B,C) = 30% means that 30% of the voters rank
the candidates in decreasing order of preference as A followed by B, and then
by C. As a result of these preferences, in an election between candidates A and
B alone, B would win 56% of the votes. But in a three-way election, A would
win, with the votes distributed as in Table 2. Similar problems can arise in the
selection of committees with k > 1 as well.
Preference vector Percentage of votes
(A,B,C) 30
(A,C,B) 10
(B,A,C) 6
(B,C,A) 25
(C,A,B) 4
(C,B,A) 25
Table 1: Example of a ballot with full preference list indicated.
Candidate Percentage of votes
A 40
B 31
C 29
Table 2: The ballot from Table 1 with only the top preference indicated.
One way to counteract this is to conduct preliminary elections within the
party, in our case the Liberals, to select candidate B to represent them, and
then conducting an election between candidates A and B. But we seek methods
to make a decision based on a single election.
The reason candidate B is preferable to A is that if we compare the two of
them, a larger percentage of the voters would prefer B. In fact, if we compare
any two candidates, B is preferred. This type of candidate is called a Condorcet
winner, and this criterion, that she be preferred by a majority in any pairwise
comparison is called the Condorcet criterion. However, every election need not
have a Condorcet winner. A voting method that uses the Condorcet criterion
to select a winner is called a Condorcet method.
To check whether the Condorcet criterion is satisfied, we may ask each voter
to supply his/her full list of preferences, as in Table 1, and if there is a Condorcet
winner, we can elect her to the committee. However, if there is no Condorcet
winner, we still need a method to choose the winner. We can compare the
2
candidates pairwise and choose the candidate who wins the most pairwise com-
parisons, and this is called the Copeland Method.
To elect a single winner, we can also use approval voting [1]. We ask each
voter to approve two candidates, and we select the candidate with the most
number of approvals. In our example, assuming that each voter approves of his
top two preferences, A is approved by 50% of the voters, B is approved by 86%,
and C, by 64%. This elects candidate B, as desired.
Approval voting is not a Condorcet method, in general. However, in large
elections with, say, a million voters, and about twenty candidates, it is impracti-
cal to require the voters to provide a full list of preferences, and hence Condercet
or Copeland methods are infeasible but approval voting is eminently feasible.
Motivated by this feature, and also because it is amenable to the analytical
methods we employ, we consider only approval voting and some of its variants
in this paper.
II. Shortcomings of the Minisum and
Minimax Voting Methods
Suppose we have to elect a committee of k representatives from a pool of n
candidates. Further, suppose there are m voters and each of them can approve
of an arbitrary number of candidates.
We will consider the example used in [3] shown in Table 3. In this case
n = 5,m = 4 and k = 2.We represent the ballot of voter 1 by the n-dimensional
binary vector (1, 1, 0, 0, 1), and similarly for all the other voters.
A B C D E
1 1 1 0 0 1
2 1 1 0 0 0
3 1 1 1 1 0
4 0 0 1 1 1
Table 3: The example from [3] showing the approvals of the voters 1, 2 . . . 4 for
the candidates A, B . . .E. An approval is indicated by a “1”.
Now, we wish to select a committee of size k = 2, and the most common
method is called the minisum method. This means we simply select the top
k candidates with the most votes, in this case A and B. Like ballots, we also
represent committees by binary vectors of length n with a 1 denoting member-
ship in the committee. Thus we represent the committee consisting of A and B
by the binary vector (1, 1, 0, 0, 0). This method is called the minisum strategy
because, if you take the Hamming distances of this committee-vector to each of
the m ballot-vectors, in this case 1, 0, 2, 5, and add them, this is the committee
vector that minimizes this sum. We now prove this result.
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Let the candidates be numbered from 1 to n, and let the number of approvals
for them be a1, a2, . . . an, respectively. Without loss of generality, assume a1 ≥
a2 ≥ . . . ≥ an. Let the committee that minimizes the sum of Hamming distances
be (i1, i2, . . . ik). This minimum value is equal to
(a1 + a2 + . . .+ an)− (ai1 + ai2 + . . . aik),
which, neglecting ties for the kth position, is obviously minimized when
(i1, i2, . . . ik) = (1, 2, . . . k).
This result allows us to consider the problem of finding the minisum commit-
tee as an optimization problem since we have a computable number, the sum of
Hamming distances, that enables us to compare any two committees and choose
the better one. But this method does not weigh disapprovals enough (as seen
earlier in Table 2) and so, a method called the minimax was introduced [6].
This method chooses the committee which minimizes the maximum Hamming
distance to the ballots. Under this, we elect the committee of A and C, i.e., the
vector (1, 0, 1, 0, 0).
We will demonstrate the inadequacies of these methods bv considering the
example in Table 4, with m = 1000 voters to elect a committee of k = 2
members. We name the n = 4 candidates A1, A2, B1 and B2 to indicate the
correlation of ballots between candidates A1 and A2 and between B1 and B2.
For simplicity, in the rest of the paper, we restrict each of the voters to approve
the same number of candidates as the size of the committee, in this case, two.
Candidate pair Votes
{A1, A2} 500
{A1, B1} 100
{A1, B2} 10
{A2, B1} 20
{A2, B2} 20
{B1, B2} 350
Table 4: An example of a ballot which exhibits correlations of votes, possibly
between candidates with the same ideology.
Using the minisum method, we would elect candidates A1 and A2, as they
have the most number of approvals, as shown in Table 5. However, this leaves
35% of the voters without either of their choices in the committee.
The minimax method is even worse because it does not narrow the choices at
all; all of the
(
n
k
)
=
(
4
2
)
= 6 committees yield the same minimax distance and it
results in all ballots tied at a Hamming distance of 4. Such tie is almost certain
whenever the number of voters is large but the number of possible committees is
small. For example, when there are a million voters and a committee of size 2 to
be chosen from 10 candidates, it is highly likely that there is one of the million
4
Candidate Number of approvals
A1 500 + 100 + 10 = 610
A2 500 + 20 + 20 = 540
B1 100 + 20 + 350 = 470
B2 10 + 20 + 350 = 380
Table 5: The number of approvals per candidate, using the ballots from Table 4.
voters who is against both candidates in every possible one of the
(
10
2
)
= 45
committees. In this case, the minimax method will yield the same minimax
distance of 4 for every one of the 45 possible committees. Related papers [2, 3] do
not elaborate upon this shortcoming but instead focus on efficient computation
of the minimax solution.
Another problem with the minimax method is that it weighs disapprovals
too highly. A single voter can change the outcome of the entire election. Sup-
pose 1000 voters are choosing a committee of size two from four candidates,
{A1, A2, B1, B2}. Further suppose that the first 998 vote for A1, A2, the 999th
voter for {A1, B2} and the 1000th voter for {B1, B2}. Then the maximum
distance to {A1, A2} is 4 due to the 1000th voter’s ballot, but the maximum
distance to {A1, B2} is only two, and therefore the minimax method elects the
committee {A1, B2}. Candidate A2 who was approved by 998 of the 1000 voters
is not in the committee!
An intuitively superior choice for the committee based on the ballots in
Table 4 would be {A1, B1}, where 98% of the voters get at least one of their
choices on the committee. This seems fairer because a committee where I get
one choice and you get one choice should be preferred over another committee
where one of us gets two choices, and the other none. The minisum method does
not prefer one of these committees over the other but we will now demonstrate
a method that does so, and chooses the committee {A1, B1} in this example.
III. The p-norm Minimization Method
We represent each of the possible committees as a binary vector (c1, c2, . . . , cn)
with ci = 1 if candidate i is in the committee. Each of the m approval ballots
is a vector of the same form, (b1, b2, . . . , bn). For each candidate committee-
vector, we calculate the vector of Hamming distances of the ballot-vectors from
it. This vector has size m, the number of voters. The components of this vector
of Hamming distances are all even (This is a property of binary vectors of equal
1-norm.) In the case of the committee {A1, A2}, this vector will have a 1000
components, with 500 of these being 0, 150 of these being 2, and 350 of these
being 4. For each of the candidate committee-vectors, this distance information
is summarized in Table 6.
Suppose for a certain committee, the number of ballots at a Hamming dis-
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Committee # of ballots # of ballots # of ballots
at distance 0 at distance 2 at distance 4
{A1, A2} 500 150 350
{A1, B1} 100 880 20
{A1, B2} 10 970 20
{A2, B1} 20 970 10
{A2, B2} 20 880 100
{B1, B2} 350 150 500
Table 6: Number of ballots at different distances from the possible committees,
using the ballots from Table 4.
tance of i is νi. The p-norm of the Hamming distance vector for this committee
is, therefore, (∑
i
νi · i
p
)1/p
.
We then find the committee that minimizes this p-norm.
We investigate the result of using intermediate values of p in Table 7. Mini-
mizing the 1-norm yields the same solution as minisum; minimizing the∞-norm
yields the same solution as minimax. Notice that as the value of p → ∞, the
value of the distance tends to 4, the maximum Hamming distance.
Value of p in the p-norm
Committee 1 2 3 4 10 100
{A1, A2} 1700 78.74 28.68 17.42 7.19 4.24
{A1, B1} 1840 61.97 20.26 11.77 5.42 4.12
{A1, B2} 2020 64.81 20.83 11.99 5.42 4.12
{A2, B1} 1980 63.56 20.33 11.60 5.08 4.09
{A2, B2} 2160 71.55 23.78 14.11 6.34 4.19
{B1, B2} 2300 92.74 32.14 19.00 7.45 4.26
Table 7: p-norm of the m-vector for all the possible committees for different
values of p, using the ballots from Table 4. The value in bold is the minimizer
for its column.
At higher values of p, the number of voters who have not voted for a given
committee is weighted higher, compared to the number of voters who have voted
for at least one member of the committee. We suggest that using this method,
choosing a small value of p such as 2 or 3, is a good compromise between the
minisum and minimax solution, since it weighs disapprovals more than minisum,
but is much less likely to tie than minimax.1
1The p-norm method will produce a tie for finite p, if the number of ballots at each distance
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Note that for p, equal to 2 or 3, this method chooses the committee {A1, B1},
which contains at least one choice of 98% of the voters. This is the intuitively
superior choice we identified earlier.
It is clear that this method generalizes for larger values of k, the commit-
tee size, with the distances ranging across all the even integers from 0 to 2k,
assuming n ≥ 2k.
Maximum Coverage Problem (p → ∞)
In this example, note that the optimal solution for p ≥ 3 always produces the
committee {A2, B1}.Observe that this is the committee with the least number of
voters who did not approve of any member in it, i.e., 1%. It is easy to show this
is true in general: For sufficiently large but finite p, the p-norm method produces
the solution with the least number of voters at distance 2k, and therefore the
committee with the “maximum coverage”. Intuitively, this method corresponds
to weighing disapprovals more than approvals.
Let the committees C and C′ have νi and ν
′
i voters respectively at a Hamming
distance of i. Let the p-norm of the vector of Hamming distances from C be ||C||p.
Since
lim
p→∞
||C||p
||C′||p
= lim
p→∞
(
2k∑
i=0
νi · i
p
)1/p
(
2k∑
i=0
ν′i · i
p
)1/p = limp→∞
(
2k∑
i=0
νi ·
(
i
2k
)p)1/p
(
2k∑
i=0
ν′i ·
(
i
2k
)p)1/p =
(
ν2k
ν′
2k
)1/p
,
we see that for sufficiently large p, the committee with minimum p-norm is the
one which has the minimum number of voters at distance 2k. This committee
minimizes the number of voters who disapprove of every one of its members,
and thereby maximizes the number of voters who approve of at least one of its
members. We can intuitively think of the Maximum Cover method as mini-
mizing disapprovals, and in that sense, the other extreme of minisum, which
maximizes approvals.
The maximum coverage problem [4] is a classic question in computer science
and computational complexity theory, and in its standard form, it is phrased as
follows:
You are given several overlapping sets and a number k. You must
choose at most k of the sets such that the union of the selected sets
is of maximum size.
The voting problem can be interpreted as an adaptation of this. The sets
we are given are the voters who approved of a particular candidate. We are to
is the same for two candidate committees. In this case, there will be a tie between these two
committees for all values of p. This is much less likely than a tie in the minimax case where
two committees will be tied if there one ballot at the maximum possible distance from each
of them.
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choose k candidates in order to maximize the number of voters with at least
one of their approved candidates on the committee. We will treat our example
in Table 4 as an instance of this problem.
It is easy to see that the maximum cover in this case will be the committee
{A2, B1}, covering 99% of the voters. This is the same result when p is large
but finite. While it is known that the maximum coverage problem is NP-hard,
if the committee size k is small, the number of possible committees,
(
n
k
)
is also
modest, and the NP-hardness of the maximum cover problem does not pose a
computational problem. In such cases, the maximum cover committee can be
computed exactly as we have done. There may be many elections where this is
true and where the maximum cover committee can be computed without undue
effort. For example, one could consider electing both the senators from a US
state2 from a set of aspirants through state-wide approval voting, and choosing
the maximum cover committee.
It is known that the greedy algorithm is often a good approximation to the
solution of the maximum coverage problem. [7]. Further, the greedy algorithm
is computationally simpler than calculating the Hamming distance vector for
each of the possible committees, and minimizing the p-norm. Therefore, the
greedy algorithm applied to the problem of ensuring that the maximum number
of voters get at least one of their approved candidates on the committee can be
a computationally efficient, as well as reasonable, voting method, if the com-
mittee size k is so large that the maxiumum cover problem cannot be solved
exactly. Applying the greedy algorithm to the example in Table 4, the first
candidate we choose is A1, since we can cover 61% of the voters with this. After
choosing A1, we can cover the most number of additional voters by choosing
B1, yielding the committee {A1, B1}. This is the same result we get with the
p-norm minimization method, with p = 2 and p = 3.
The case where p → 0
We now investigate the effect of letting p→ 0. In this case, it is the number of
votes that the committee as a whole wins that matters, and not the number of
votes of each of the constituent members. This can be shown using the same
technique we used in the case of p→∞. Using the same notation as before, we
get
lim
p→0
||C||p
||C′||p
= lim
p→0
(
2k∑
i=0
νi · i
p
)1/p
(
2k∑
i=0
ν′i · i
p
)1/p =
(
m− ν0
m− ν′
0
)1/p
.
So this method chooses the committee with the least value of m − ν0 or
the committee with the highest value of ν0, namely approvals. In the previous
2This would require amending the class system where each senator from a state is elected
for different but overlapping terms.
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example from Table 4, the result with p = 1 coincides with the one with p→ 0;
we will therefore use a different example which is shown in Table 8.
Candidate pair Votes
{A1, A2} 300
{A1, B1} 250
{A1, B2} 150
{A2, B1} 40
{A2, B2} 60
{B1, B2} 200
Table 8: An example of a ballot to demonstrate the result of p→ 0.
We can see that the candidates with the most votes are A1 and B1, as
shown in Table 9, and according to the minisum method, i.e., with p = 1, the
committee that will be elected is {A1, B1}. However, reducing the value of p,
we see, from Table 10 that the elected committee changes to {A1, A2}, the pair
that obtained the most votes, even though candidate A2 received the fewest
number of votes in total.
Candidate Number of approvals
A1 300 + 250 + 150 = 700
A2 300 + 40 + 60 = 400
B1 250 + 40 + 200 = 490
B2 150 + 60 + 200 = 410
Table 9: The number of approvals per candidate, using the ballots from Table 8.
IV. Ternary Voting
It has not escaped our notice that this method of choosing the committee that
minimizes the p-norm of the vector of Hamming distances to the ballots, can
be generalized to include ternary voting [5]. In this form of election, the voters
can express their opinion about a fixed number of candidates, each of whom
can either be approved (represented by a 1) or rejected (represented by a −1).
Consider the example from Table 1 and let the voters be allowed two opinions
or non-zero entries. The voters who have preference vector (A,B,C) have three
ways to express their preference using ternary voting, namely, (1, 1, 0), (1, 0,−1),
or (0,−1,−1).
In the case of only three representatives, the voters can actually indicate
their full preference vector through ternary voting, but with more candidates,
3Strictly speaking, this should not be termed a norm for p < 1 since the triangle inequality
is reversed.
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Value of p in the p-norm
Committee 1 0.5 0.1 0.001
{A1, A2} 1800 1107.11 765.63 700.62
{A1, B1} 1620 1095.81 808.45 750.56
{A1, B2} 1780 1225.51 914.08 850.62
{A2, B1} 2220 1445.51 1040.44 960.77
{A2, B2} 2380 1475.81 1026.70 940.83
{B1, B2} 2200 1307.11 880.50 800.76
Table 10: p-norm3 of the m-vector, raised to the power p, for all the possible
committees, for different values of p, using the ballots from Table 8. We raise
the p-norm to the power p to keep the values bounded for small p. The value
in bold is the minimizer for its column.
the full preference list is too complex to express. Moreover, it may be that the
voter is actually neutral about most of the candidates, but rejects a few, and
this form of ternary voting allows them to express this.
Under ternary voting, we need to replace the Hamming distance between a
candidate committee, (c1, c2, . . . , cn) and a ballot, (b1, b2, . . . , bn) by some suit-
able metric. Since the Hamming metric corresponds to the L1-metric, namely,∑n
i=1|ci − bi|, it is natural to consider the same metric under ternary voting.
However, we must revise our vector representation of the committees. If we
represent the hypothetical committee consisting of the first two out of four can-
didates as (1, 1, 0, 0), then the distance to the ballot (1, 1, 0, 0) will be 0, whereas
the distance to the ballot (0, 0,−1,−1) will be 4. This is a bad model since a
voter disapproving of the last two candidates is implicitly approving the first
two. Therefore, this candidate committee is better represented by (1, 1,−1,−1)
in which case the distance to both the ballots will be 2, in accordance with our
intuition.
Our generalization of approval voting from binary to ternary voting, to elect
a committee of size k from n candidates, is the following. We represent each
of the possible committees as a ternary vector (c1, c2, . . . , cn) with ci = 1 if
candidate i is in the committee, and ci = −1, otherwise. Each of the m approval
ballots is a ternary vector (b1, b2, . . . , bn) where bi = 1 if the voter approves
candidate i, bi = −1 if the voter rejects candidate i, and bi = 0 otherwise (the
voter has no opinion). Each voter must express k opinions and therefore make
k entries in his ballot as 1 or −1; the rest of the entries must be zero. For the
sake of mathematical simplicity (or elegance!), we have arbitrarily chosen to
weigh approvals and rejections equally—a voter uses up one choice to approve
a candidate, or to reject a candidate.
It is interesting to ask what the properties of the p-norm committees are, for
various values of p, under ternary voting. Suppose candidate i has ai approvals,
ri rejections, and ni = m− ai − ri neutral votes. Then, candidate i contributes
ni + 2ri = m− ai − ri + 2ri = m− (ai − ri)
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to the 1-norm if he is in the committee, and
ni + 2ai = m− ai − ri + 2ai = m+ (ai − ri)
if he is not in the committee. Therefore, the minimum 1-norm committee con-
sists of the k candidates with the k least values of m− (ai− ri), or equivalently,
the k highest values of ai − ri. This is an intuitively pleasing extension of the
minisum method to ternary voting: the 1-norm committee minimizes the sum
of the net approvals of its members, when rejections (explicit disapprovals) are
allowed.
Similarly, we can extend our result of maximum coverage to ternary voting
as well. Suppose we wish to elect a committee of k members from a set of n.
Let each voter choose k candidates to either approve or reject. We see that the
L1-distance from the committees to the ballots ranges from n− k to n+ k, and
using the same method as before, we see that as p → ∞, the committee that
is selected is the one with the least number of ballots at distance n + k. It is
clear that a ballot is only at this distance when none of the candidates that are
approved are on the committee, and all the candidates that are rejected are on
the committee. Therefore, in the context of the Maximum Coverage Problem,
we consider a voter to be covered if any of the candidates he approves is on the
committee, or if any of the candidates he rejects is not on the committee. Then,
in this case also, choosing the committee that covers the maximum number of
voters is better than using the minimax method because of the preponderance
of ties that arise using the latter method.
We conclude this section with an example. Consider the example of Table 4
but with one change: the 500 voters who approved {A1, A2} now choose to
approve A1 and reject B1. Perhaps B1 evokes strong emotions and the votaries
of A1 and A2 would prefer to sacrifice approving A2 and instead reject B1. All
other votes remain the same. The results of this election are shown in Table 11
for various values of the p-norm.
Value of p in the p-norm
Committee 1 2 3 4 10 100
{A1, A2} 3700 130.38 44.68 26.59 10.79 6.36
{A1, B1} 3840 123.29 39.46 22.42 8.57 6.18
{A1, B2} 3020 101.39 33.76 19.82 8.38 6.18
{A2, B1} 4980 161.12 51.97 29.73 11.21 6.39
{A2, B2} 4160 133.27 42.74 24.41 9.65 6.28
{B1, B2} 4300 147.65 49.38 28.84 11.18 6.38
Table 11: p-norm of the m-vector for all the possible committees for different
values of p, under ternary voting, using the ballots from Table 4 except that the
500 voters who approved A1 and A2 now choose to approve A1 and reject B1.
The value in bold is the minimizer for its column.
For every value of p, the committee elected is {A1, B2}. Compare this result
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with Table 7 where this particular committee is not elected for any value of p.
Moreover, B1 was elected in the binary case for all p ≥ 2 but is never elected
in this ternary case. The option to reject a candidate, as opposed to approve
another candidate, can dramatically change the result of an election!
V. Summary
We see that all three known approval voting methods—the committee with the
most approvals, the minisum committee and the minimax committee—are all
special cases of our p-norm method for p → 0, p = 1 and p → ∞ respectively.
However, using an intermediate value of p such as 2 or 3 is probably a bet-
ter choice than any of these methods as a compromise between approvals and
disapprovals.
The minimax method is particularly unsuitable for this type of election given
the preponderance of ties, especially when the number of voters is large, and
should be logically replaced by the Maximum Cover method, which too is a
special case of our p-norm method for large, but finite, p, and intuitively corre-
sponds to minimizing disapprovals.
We also showed that our p-norm method can be generalized to the problem
of ternary voting, and the interpretations of the results when p = 1 and p→∞
are natural analogs of the binary case.
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